W h at arc m acrom otivcs?
One can loosely define the object o f our inquiry in the following way: "m acromotives" are encompassing themes that have decisively shaped the development o f both W estern and Eastern culture, from the historical beginnings o f these cultures right up to the present time. These themes take the form o f something like ultimate values that inspire and motivate (hence their being designated as " motives") not only individuals, but also patterns o f collective social behaviour and even cultural concerns o f an epochal nature. In the latter case one finds changes in value-profiles helping to initiate new types o f thought and behaviour, in for example the era o f antiquity, the Middle ages, and the modem period. Macromotivational values are profiled within such historical time-frames by being "translated" into an assortment o f cultural concerns that become characteristic o f a particular time-frame. Examples o f such concerns with regard to our own epoch are: Individual Liberty and Technological Progress. Given the significance that concerns like these have in current cultural time -and that com parable concerns have had in other time-frames -it is not so surprising that we find it in the very nature o f macromotives to effect in us feelings o f the deepest awe and admiration.
In this article four macromotives will be introduced, macromotives whose character and impact are in keeping with the general description above (though I will focus mainly on the W estern cultural context). These motives will be presented as "phenom ena" that have confronted humanity, throughout the course o f its evolution, in the most overwhelming manner -phenom ena that are transcendently magnificent in what they are and in what they do; phenomena, also, that seem to exist at the limit, or rather, to constitute the limit, o f w hat we ourselves are and what we can hope to do. Faced with manifestations o f such grandeur, individuals and civilizations have always felt the urge to turn to these manifestations as the objects o f their greatest concern, their highest tributes, their noblest efforts.
T he m otive o f nature
Probably the first phenomenon o f this kind that ever filled human beings with a deep and lasting wonder w as nature itself. Here was a looming presence, a brooding assembly o f indestructible forces: elemental and am orphous, yet aggressively alive. These restless forces literally surrounded primitive humanity and completely controlled the life o f the tribe. As we know, the people o f the tribe often experienced themselves as virtually the expression or extension o f these forces. The latter flowed through human beings no less than through animals. They moved in a mysterious way, their cyclic w onders to perform. Rivers, forests and mountains too, shone with a spirited aliveness. Things and people had this intimate co-existence with nature from their very beginning in time. And -so it w as believed in some o f the most ancient religions -it is to this unformed and unknowable nature that they always returned, in the ceaseless and cyclical flow that determines the existence o f all individual things.
Through the centuries, humanity's experience o f nature has evolved from these beginnings to perceptions that are, o f course, markedly different. Yet an essential continuity has been preserved. For even today we often still feel engulfed by the great pre-cultural world in which our personal lives attain the significance o f dust. Although now we shudder not so much before a wilful nature that intimately and capriciously touches our existence, as before a scientifically disclosed universe that finally and silently presides over " m an's search for m eaning" .
In comparing these two different experiences, an interesting question arises. Is the current scientific picture we have o f the universe -an explosively bom, swiftly expanding mass o f swirling galaxies, star-sucking " black holes" etc. -necessarily the "real" picture? Some scientists see no compelling reason to assume that it is. Perhaps our picture is, in fact, a likeness o f ju st one o f the faces o f the universe. The latter face in effect being one in a long row o f masks that the universe has donned, from time immemorial, in its dealings with mankind.1 But if this is indeed the case, then it seems to be all the more reason for us to think with even greater reverence o f this universe in which we live, move and have our being. Because w e then realise that this universe is simply too great for us to have any adequate image o f it -ever. Unlike the images o f their God that were prohibited to the people o f Israel, images -in the form o f scientific models -o f our universe are indispensable to us. But sometimes, in the end, they seem to be equally inapplicable. In relation, that is, to a Face which simply cannot be gazed upon or imagined.
W hat should also be taken into account here, is that not only is our overall picture o f the universe continually changing -we also find in modem times the constituent features o f any given picture constantly being revised: sometimes with far-reaching effects on the broader picture itself. Com pare, for example, a new spaper report o f some years back with the heading: " Looking at the universe with new eyes" (Sunday S tar Review, 1991 -01 -27) . In this report it is stated that scientists' theories about the formation o f galaxies have quite suddenly been thrown into disarray. The cause o f this is the ongoing deciphering o f massive amounts o f data received from a spacecraft that was launched in 1983. The significance o f the data is only now becoming apparent to scientists. The report states that " up to last w eek" it had generally been believed that the universe was evenly filled with stars and planets. But now the new data suggests that in fact huge voids fill the universe, interspersed with the occasional m assive cluster o f galaxies. An astrophysicist from Oxford w as quoted as saying: "Can w e please have a new model for the universe as soon as possible?" These masks o f the universe that we seemingly have to content ourselves withhow have they actually appeared to us in history? A specialized historical study o f nature as a macromotive would have to delve into this question in detail. In the present context, I can only refer the interested reader to an excellent sampling o f such a history in an acclaimed book by physicist Edward Harrison (which I have already referred to, see note 1). Among the "universes" (that is, the masks o f the unknown universe) that this author distinguishes, from the beginnings o f cultural history and up to (but excluding) the present scientific conception o f the universe, are the following: the magic universe, the mythic universe, the geometric universe, the medieval universe, the infinite universe, and the mechanistic universe.
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For an interpretation along these lines, see Harrison (1985) . I borrow the mask analogy from him.
Koers 61 (2) 1996:129-151 Harrison's succession o f "m asks" is one way o f reading the history o f the universe. There are also ways o f reading the history o f natural reality in the narrower sense o f this concept -namely as e a rth ly or e n viro n m e n ta l nature. One could, for example, study the w ay that this aspect o f nature is perceived in terms o f (broad) cultural-historical time frames, like those o f antiquity, or the M iddle ages, or the age o f Enlightenment. Parallel to H arrison's periodisation, or super imposed upon the latter, we could thus distinguish a succession o f environmental images. With reference to the three time-frames ju st mentioned, one could perhaps speak o f o rg a n ism ic nature, id ea listic nature, and m e c h a n istic nature.2 An interesting modern-day development in the history o f nature is the so-called Gaia hypothesis, developed by the British scientist James Lovelock. According to this theory, the earth is to be thought o f as a single, giant organism. If this model becomes broadly accepted, we will, in a way, be w itnessing a significant return o f the organismic perceptions o f antiquity. ("G aia" w as indeed the name o f the Greek goddess o f the earth.) This time, however, these perceptions will be founded not on a mythic world picture, but on sophisticated scientific analysis. O f course, the development o f organismic models o f nature has also been advocated for some time now by environmental enthusiasts and N ew Age activists.
Returning to the theme o f nature in the expanded sense o f universe, a decisive question arises -one to which we shall return in the context o f the other macromotives.
Why, a n d b y w hat logic, is it p o ssib le f o r n a tu re in th is se n se to e vo ke a sp e c ie s o f se m i-relig io u s fe e lin g in th e m in d s o f p e o p le ?
The first type of, let us call it "em otive" logic, that is connected to this specific m acromotive (in its modem world context) is, I believe, a sp a tia l one. It is in our spatial experience o f reality that we encounter part-whole relations in their original (nonanalogical, non-metaphorical) sense. And it is the logic o f parts and w holes that is fundamental to the feelings o f awe that the universe inspires in us. For nothing is so in clu sive as the universe. The universe is even per definition that which is all-inclusive. But for the universe to be all-inclusive, for a n y th in g to be allinclusive, means for it to be ... like God.3
The second type o f logic that accom panies nature -now in the narrow er senseis a n u m e ric a l one. It revolves around our intuitive experience o f an order o f 2 For some brief historical notes along these lines, see Sehuurman ( 1977:25-39) .
3 Cf. the following sentiment: "The Universe is everything. What it is in its own right, independent o f our changing opinions, we never know The Universe is all-inclusive and includes us; we arc a part or an aspect o f the Universe experiencing and thinking about itself' (Harrison 1985:1) . For a discussion o f classical theological models o f God as a "containing" Being, sec Kremer (1969) .
time that is expressed in relations o f priority and succession: the sequence o f first, second, third, an so on. In this context, people think o f nature as being the primary reality, out o f which everything else emerged. Such has the impact o f the philosophy (for it is indeed much more than simply a scientific theory) of evolutionism been on our life and world view, that this particular logic o f the nature motive has become the most persuasive logic when it comes to thinking about humanity and history. And here, too, nature becomes like God, now in the sense o f "being in the beginning" .
T he m otive o f know ledge
Thus, at the dawn o f human existence, nature prevails. It was, however, not long before cracks and fissures began to appear in the dome o f physical and vital forces that enclosed human existence from all sides. These fissures w ere effected by a capacity that human beings began to discover within themselves: the capacity to produce knowledge and understanding. For this capacity w ent hand in hand with the ability to conceptualise, to analyse, to gain insight by means of seeing into the nature o f things. This ability meant that not only the nature of things, but more significantly, the things o f nature itself became prone to a certain demystification, a certain desacralisation. These things o f nature were liable now to be laid open before a truly inquiring sort o f perception, and so to be penetrated by a gaze that was far more powerful than that produced by the organs o f mere physical sight. This was the roving gaze o f the human cognitive faculty -turning to, and fixing upon, nature.4
To analyse, to comprehend, to reason: one who is capable o f these feats, breaks free from the mesmerising power which brute facts and forces hold over the fragile beings which they confront. Knowledge, o f course, eventually raises its sights higher than the facts and forces o f nature: it begins to target the world of culture, the world where history is made, where art is created, where science is practised, where good and evil themselves make an appearance. And it is here at this latter point, at this very summit o f human understanding, the pinnacle o f truth where good and evil seem to yield to distinction and definition, that knowledge makes "man" to be like God (as the snake suggests in G enesis 3). It is noteworthy that the Bible story depicts knowledge as the very first idol that human beings -still completely surrounded by primitive nature without being intimidated by it -lusted for. 4 The beginning of this struggle o f knowledge against nature is magnificently thematised in Horkhcimer and Adomo (1973) They see this beginning as being brought to its full potential (disastrously so) in the eighteenth ccnturj, the age o f Reason. There is something else about knowledge: a remarkable endurance. W hile every thing fades away with the passage o f time, the symbols o f know ledge remain. And, in general, they will always remain. Even if much o f w hat humanity has erected upon the face o f the earth is one day destroyed, there will, in all probability, be something that remains. If beings from other worlds, other universes, should at one time in the future come across our devastated planet, they will find the remnants o f thought -artefacts (books, tapes, instruments etc.) that will bring them face to face with objectified knowledge. And it is this face o f knowledge that is enshrined with a particular grandeur. That which any one person knows scientifically at any given time is already trem endous in pow erbut this conscious and subjective know ledge is no match for the staying pow er o f transconscious and objective knowledge. This anonymous know ledge speaks to us and watches over us in the myriad creations o f science, art and technology, and o f culture in general.5
In our discussion o f the nature motive above, the question was asked: by what peculiar "em otive" logic does this motive evoke feelings o f awe and submission in us? The suggested answer drew our attention to the enclosing capability o f nature (the latter understood in its expanded function o f universe). But w hat o f knowledge? Is there a similar feature, a unique characteristic, by which knowledge convinces us o f its own majesty and power? There are, quite possibly, a number o f such features. But let us look at only one -perhaps the most important one, at least for people w hose relations with know ledge are o f an essentially m odem type, that is, dating from about the eighteenth century. For it is approxim ately since then, that w e have become increasingly aw are, or have One way o f describing this particular capability is to say that knowledge represents things. In the knowledge that we have o f objects, they always appear to us in a specific form. They are not simply what they are; they are what our knowledge makes o f them, or more correctly, what our knowledge makes them out to be. Knowledge, in fact, frames things, staictures them in certain ways, portrays them by forming pictures in our minds. In a certain sense, things seem to exist only in the conceptual pictures we have o f them. The mind's eye does not passively register things and facts and actions -it brings systems and patterns and complex organizing principles into play.
I should at this stage point out that, although the model o f the constituting mind has a " surface" history leading back to the philosophers o f classical rationalism (Descartes, Leibniz, Kant), it has a "deep" history reaching back much further. W hat is essentially at stake in proclaiming the constitutive pow er o f the mind, is thus a decision to grant inner reality priority over all outer reality. And w e find this decision, as such, already being made by prominent thinkers o f the Hellenistic age.7 W hat happened in modem times was that the m ind's priority over outer reality was given an increasingly stringent scientific foundation.
In any case, if it is true what contemporary philosophers, psychologists, biologists say o f the m ind's representational structure, can we then think o f anything more primary than know ledge?8 Everything -that is, everything that exists in our world o f experience -is in some way made the way that it is, by knowledge. From this perspective, we can thus see knowledge bringing order even to nature itself. Accordingly, it might seem quite appropriate to award victory to knowledge over and against nature, in this, a possible first round in the eternal conflict o f the macromotives.9 But then there are some other motives, which
have not yet had their say in this presentation. 6 The philosophy o f Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) played an important part in convincing people of this particular capability o f know ledge See Kant ( 1965) 7 An insightful history o f the " inncr/outcr" theme, among five other themes foundational to Western thought, is found in Hcimsocth (1922).
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For a very comprehensive overview o f recent interdisciplinary approaches to the representational structure o f the mind, see Gardner (1987) 9
The relation between nature's apparent causing of knowledge (such as we would find, for example, in theories of the evolutionary development o f knowledge in the human specics), and knowledge's seeming creation o f nature (by way of the concepts constituting our cxpcricncc of the latter) can be a serious problem for modern-day philosophers. For
T he m otive o f pow er
The concepts o f knowledge and pow er are traditionally closely associated. We all know the saying that knowledge is power. But, although know ledge certainly does represent pow er o f some sort, this power is but a pale reflection o f "pure" power, o f pow er in itself. W hat is power in itself?10 More important in the present context, what is power as a macromotive? And how does it relate to the two motives already discussed? In biblical imagery, we must now depart from the garden o f Eden (nature and knowledge) to visit the tow er o f Babel (power).
The first thing to notice is that pow er does indeed "play in the same league" as the motives o f knowledge and nature. It possesses the same kind o f presence, the same radiant significance in relation to everything personal, social and cultural. It appears to us throughout history as something that creates, binds, drives, channels and changes. And it does this both to things and to people. Power, in brief, reigns: pow er is reign or rule itself. Something that is important in this depiction is the element o f purposeful action. Power is a very special kind o f force: it is only actualised in relation to, or in the context of, the various goals that human beings set for themselves -their plans and projections, their ambitions and desires. In this respect, pow er is definitely not a blind force (devoid o f any rational element) like the forces o f nature. Power always makes its entrance into the world whenever people start to imagine, in a quite logical w ay, changes to the face o f the world around them -however small or great the scope o f these changes might be.
And with this last thought we have arrived at a position where w e can see something o f the relation between pow er on the one hand, and nature and knowledge on the other hand. O f course, the way in which we interpret this relation, is wholly determined by our answ er to the question: Which o f these two macromotives do you respect most? In the present section we are allowing the motive o f pow er to speak with full authority to us. And in the grip o f this remarks on how this problem presents itself in the thought of the well-known social theorist Jiirgcn Habermas, see McCarthy (1978: 111) 10 Strictly speaking, power or any other phenomenon that we may encounter, docs not at any level exist "in itself'. Everything is intrinsically related to many other things, and all things bear in themselves traccs o f the variously structured relationships within which they exist Such relationships arc in fact constitutive to the individual identity of things. The (non-) theory o f dcconstruction, authored by French philosopher Jacques Derrida, and popular w ith the exponents o f so-called postmodern thought, can be credited with providing a novel (if completely one-sided) insight into this state of affairs The idea o f a thing existing " in and for itself' is basically a heritage o f Greek metaphysics, and is in conflict with just about every modem philosophical and scientific assumption about the nctwork-likc interconnectedness o f reality.
authority it will appear obvious that power is even greater than both nature and knowledge.
First, as regards nature, it has already appeared that the latter can never appropriate the distinctively rational element inherent in the operations o f power. Nature is vast, but there is no method to its vastness. Further, pow er in this way not only seems to rise a step above nature; it also manages to change nature. Think only o f w hat technology can do to nature and remember that the former is but a name for power.
Second, as regards knowledge, here too pow er must seemingly triumph, for, however great an achievement the acquiring o f scientific knowledge o f nature is, is not the exercising o f technological control over nature, a still greater achievem ent?11 And does this trump that power holds over knowledge not also apply in the case o f their relation to society (whether the pow er here is technological or political in nature)?12 Moreover: is knowledge itself not subject to the machinations o f power? It really does seem that if history has taught us one thing, it is that knowledge does not lead a liberated existence. On the contrary, w e find that it is time and again controlled, directed, usurped, used in the interests o f (some or other) power. And it is apparently only through enlisting the help o f a saviour-power and humbling itself before this pow er, that knowledge can try to free itself from rejected forms o f power.
The history o f pow er in W estern culture is marked by a significant turning point that occurs in the context o f Christian theology and philosophy. This point is reached when the preoccupation with divine knowledge is superseded by the preoccupation with divine power. N ow the realisation dawns that, though it is a glorious thing to wholly com prehend the good, there is a still more glorious thing, namely the absolute com petence to decide the content o f the good, to lay down its law.
From the time o f the Greek philosophers, the pure intellectual faculties o f human and divine agents enjoyed a certain primacy. To a remarkable extent, this 11 Adorno and Horkhcimcr, in their critiquc o f Western rationality, do not always take into account this clear distinction between knowledge and power. O f coursc, any analysis should be free to treat knowledge and power as a kind o f complex (which is also what Foucault sometimes docs) It even seems natural to assume that macromotivcs do indeed enter into combined operations of various sorts. Nevertheless, it seems to me that one should start from a d e a r understanding of the primordially competitive relation between macromotivcs (in terms o f the interpretation accorded them).
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One is reminded here o f Karl M arx's famous statement that, while philosophers have for so long sought to interpret the world differently, we should now come to actually try and changc the world Koers 61 (2) 1996:129-151 changed during the course of, roughly, the thirteenth and the fourteenth century. During this time a new style o f philosophical and theological thought emerged, known as nominalism.13 This novel trend (which is still a dominant influence in epistemological theories o f the present time) developed new models o f God, humanity, the world, and the interrelationship between them. In these models, G reek intellectualism mostly came to be replaced or at least relativised by earlymodem voluntarism: the doctrine o f the primacy o f the will. In terms o f theological thought, the shift that we touched on above w as introduced: G o d 's will, and thereby his power, becam e the very essence o f the divine nature. This had subtle but significant consequences for perceptions, attitudes and mentalities far removed from the field o f theology.14 Will, power, sovereignty, rule and order becam e newly appreciated attributes in a variety o f contexts. (O r perhaps it is possible to say that there occurred at this time a shift to voluntarism at a certain level o f general cultural experience, which only came to be expressed in, among other things, doctrinal theology.)
This late medieval flowering o f voluntarism was actually foreshadowed, many centuries before, in the early beginnings o f Christian theological reflection. During this period, the Christian picture o f God had much in common with the w ay that the office o f the Roman em peror was viewed by the inhabitants o f this great empire. It was precisely the imperial qualities o f divine rule that were stressed in what is sometimes known as "Latin" theology -which takes us back to another great moment in the history o f power: the very existence o f the Roman empire itself. This empire was based on an obsession with pow er such as the world had never seen before, an obsession which was not only a m atter o f certain social and cultural features (for instance the enormous judicial authority wielded by the husband and father -the p a ter fa m ilia s -within a household) or o f an idiosyncratic em peror cult. It was also akin to something like a collective ethos. Thus not only the "body", but also the "soul" o f Roman society, bore the imprint o f a pervasive pow er idealism.
Early medieval society was structured in ways that represented another step forward in the march o f power. In the period o f Constantine, the church developed into a cultural colossus that was also a very refined instrument o f social control. On the one hand, the church was in a position to preside over and sanction the " earthly" pow er o f the state; on the other hand the church ju st could 13 Nominalism teachcs that univcrsals only exist in the mind as concepts, and not in reality as structures or csscnccs.
14 For insightful historical analyses o f nominalism and voluntarism in theology, see Obcrman (1967) and Knowles ( 1962 ) Klaarcn (1977 traces the effects o f these styles o f thought on the emergence o f modem science.
not resist imitating the prancing power posture o f the state. The pow er posturing o f the church w as developed along two strategic lines: internal administration and external conquest.
Finally, in this very selective overview o f highlights in the history o f pow er, we come to contemporary culture. How does the present deployment o f power com pare to its politico-ecclesiastical structuring in pre-modem times? Well, this very same structuring actually called forth, in formidable opposition to itself, a pow er formation that really inaugurated the modem era: the pervasive discourse o f emancipation from domination. This discourse has mobilised -through the course o f centuries -philosophies, movements, revolutions, paradigms and practices that have shaped the modem world. But, just as was the case with the medieval deployment o f power, there is more than one line o f development to be considered here. In fact, the complexity o f m odem pow er relations is very much greater than it could ever have been during any other period o f history. We find, in the first place, that the pow er manifested in our culture by the discourse of freedom and emancipation, is decisively countered by an impressive array of institutional powers. Science, technology, administrative bureaucracy, eco nomical imperatives, the modem mass media -these are all concentration points o f pow er on the higher systemic levels o f W estern culture. Individually and collectively they pose a threat to the individual's enjoyment o f total freedom in body and mind. Except for these "higher" manifestations, much more mobile pow er formations are also active at the middle and micro levels o f our culture. Consider for example the functions o f what I will call "protective pow er" . Health and medical care, state-sponsored security, the so-called "therapeutic industry", educational systems, and so on -these are the power structures that today facilitate our access to the last word in organised intimacy, care, guidance and protection. It is specifically at this level that a differentiated network o f power outlets has come to totally supplant (but in effect also imitate) the monitoring functions o f the monolithic church-state machine referred to above. The functions o f this cluirch-state machine were similarly directed to taking institutional care of the individual -although o f course the soul w as considered by the church to be more important in this regard than " feelings" and " self-expression" and " survival" 15
Having sampled some o f the great moments in the history o f pow er, let us now take passing note o f what might be termed the psychological profile o f power. This impulse can be called the will to pow er and glory,16 a will which, it must be granted, is not always that obvious in the behaviour o f people. As some psychological studies tried to show, it is certainly not only overtly ambitious and aggressive attitudes in people that reflect this will. Patterns o f behaviour that seem to be the very opposite o f such attitudes (for example the willingness to have people walk all over one, or the urge to escape from the world o f competition and achievement) may in fact also give expression to the universal desire for attaining some kind o f supremacy or superiority (cf. H om ey, 1945; 1950) . In individual as in cultural history, so it may seem, relations o f pow er ultimately determine the course o f events.
To conclude this section, let us now pose the same question as w e did above, in connection with the other macromotives. By what emotive logic does power actually take hold o f our imagination and lay claim to our lasting admiration and allegiance? N ature and knowledge, we have seen, inspire and intimidate us by their respective abilities to include and to precede, to represent and to constitute everything that exists. Power, however, makes its own unique impact on our minds. It does this, I would suggest, by intimating to us that all the things w e see rising above mere nature, from great cultural achievements to the m ost mundane actions that can in any way bring about something new and creative; that all these things are in the end nothing but varied manifestations o f the capacity to purposively effect change. This capacity would seem to be the real origin o f everything that bears the mark o f design and desire.
T he m otive o f personhood
The fourth and last macromotive to be introduced here, is that o f personhood. This is the motive that places the human self before us. In the grip o f this motive, we are confronted with the phenomenon o f the person as a majestic and mysterious presence, a living presence that can address us and the world around us like no other being or force on earth can. Central in the theme o f this motive is the element o f subjectivity: a subjectivity that is entrancingly active and alive, the source o f an unending stream o f thoughts and acts that range freely and creatively over all sectors o f reality. In a sense this macromotive comes nearer than all the others in attaining a presence similar to that o f God -that is to say, similar to what human beings have always imagined God to be like: an acting and experiencing Subject o f infinite magnitude. And even where we find the idea o f the divine expounded in impersonal concepts, like that o f being or totality or nature, these concepts are often attended by metaphors that tend to personalise, to some extent, the matter at issue. W e may even speculate that the underlying reason for this sort of personification is to be found in the fact that the attributes o f personhood are tailor-made to indicate that which transcends our capabilities for objectification and m anipulation.17
Consider for a moment how personhood might fare in the contest o f the macromotives.
Regarding the motive o f nature, personhood might seem sw allow ed up by the vastness o f nature which surrounds it. And o f course, nature not only surrounds human individuality; it forms a basic part o f this individuality in so far as the human body and its brain can be seen as a manifestation o f nature. But when one heeds the voice o f personhood, one sees this perceiving body as being capable o f a super-natural feat, as it were: being acutely conscious o f itself. V astness is great, but is surpassed by the consciousness o f vastness.
In relation to knowledge, personhood may seem to be enveloped by the great systems o f objective and anonymous knowledge that have been developed in the history o f science. In the context o f these systems, personhood is perceived to be primarily a field or an object or an element o f knowledge. But from the vantage point o f the former motive, the great body o f objective knowledge contained in books, papers, theories, arguments etc. cannot be considered to outrank its origin and destination -the subjective user and producer o f such knowledge.
As to pow er, again personhood may seem to shrink into insignificance beside the resources and the sheer cultural reach o f this macromotive. Yet one simple question brings quite another perspective: can pow er give an account o f itself -or judge itself? On the contrary; it is up to people, to persons, to personhood -to sit in judgem ent o f all forms o f power. And even if this judgem ent is delivered from a position o f captivity to power, its moral reach is indubitably beyond the highest level at which pure pow er can ply its trade.
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The German theologian, Wolfhart Panncnbcrg, has put forward some interesting ideas in this connection, exploring new perspectives on the relation between the personhood which is attributed to God, and that which is experienced on an inter-personal level For some discussion, sec Brinkman (1980:45) .
• Personhood experienced as being separate from the natural environm ent
As with the other macromotives, let us look briefly at some significant stages in the historical development o f personhood. The history o f personhood really begins at that hypothetical point where human beings come to experience, for the first time, their real separateness from the natural environment. At this time, there presumably arose a gradual understanding o f the differences between the w ay o f personhood and the way o f nature. This is o f course the beginning, also, o f the inroads that culture would make into nature.
In fact, at this point we see a macromotivational "alliance" o f pow er and personhood arraigned against the forces o f nature: the one member o f the alliance bent on victory over nature by directly controlling it, the other in a position to subject nature by reflectively experiencing it. Persuaded by the macrologic o f personhood, one can o f course reason that the latter conquest is o f foundational importance for the former. To put it in other words: pow er only exists there w here personal individuality has come into its own. The same relation holds, one could argue, betw een knowledge (science) and human individuality.
• The quest for personal transformation
Another notable development in the history o f personhood occurs with the beginnings o f the quest for personal transformation: the individual aspiring to consciously mould his or her manner o f living, so as to become more happy, more wise or more holy. In the history o f W estern culture, this aspect o f personhood starts coming into its own with the earliest beginnings o f G reek philosophy, the legendary Pythagoras (6th century BC) being a major figure in this regard. But it is specifically the Hellenistic and Roman periods that saw this aspect o f personhood attain, for the first time, a real and encom passing cultural significance. During this time the study o f philosophy itself was largely associated with ethics, while the latter was mainly associated with trans formational practices o f some sort; that is, practices that will aid the changing o f the self into a desired state, and also help to maintain or enhance the latter.
It should be noted that the transformational aspect o f personhood w as by no means confined to W estern culture. Eastern religions and philosophies wereand still are -heavily imbued with the very same ideal. Hindu systems, Buddhist philosophy, Chinese Taoism: they are all fundamentally involved with the art o f disciplining the self. In the East, the broad cultural and social effects o f this art were even realised much earlier than in the West.
• Personhood as a regard for the fo rm o f human nature
Let us turn now to another major development in the history o f personhood; a development which also concerns another aspect o f this macromotive; one that is significantly different from the transformational aspect just discussed. This aspect lias to do with personhood as an ideal inspiring not so much a repertoire of transformational practices, as a certain regard for the form o f human nature. At the beginning o f the modem era, this regard came to be expressed in the language o f humanism, and there sounded a new discourse on the subject o f sovereign "man" . Though the praises o f the human race have been sung since the time of antiquity, the kind o f humanism that decisively shaped modem W estern thought, only began to take shape from about the fifteenth century. te rre s tria l, n e ith e r m o rta l n o r im m o rta l, in o rd e r th a t a s a fre e a n d so v e re ig n m o d e le r a n d sc u lp to r, a s it w e re , y o u m a y fa sh io n y o u r s e lf in to th e fo rm w h ic h y o u p re fe r. Y o u are a b le to d e g e n e ra te in to th e lo w e r fo rm s , w h ic h a re th e b ru te s, a n d to re g e n e ra te y o u r s e lf b y y o u r o w n v o litio n in to th e h ig h e r, w h ic h are d iv in e. N ote that, although mention is made here o f m an's ability to fashion him self into the form o f his preference, it is in fact not the transformational aspect of personhood that is motivating this particular discourse. Rather it is another aspect o f personhood, one which looks in awe on the place which the human spirit occupies in the natural world. In other words, it is not the endeavours o f the individual to give a certain aesthetic form to his personal existence that is spotlighted here; it is the potential o f the human species, as such, to realise the most exalted forms o f freedom and creativity. And this realisation is mostly brought about by w ay o f the great cognitive and cultural achievements for which humanity (the collective manifestation o f personhood) is destined.
• Personhood as a resistance to optim istic humanism
To close this sampling o f the history o f personhood, let us look at one more highly significant development. It was during the course o f the nineteenth century that a remarkable resistance to the optimistic humanism that w e have just outlined, began to take shape. Some thinkers -such as K ierkegaard and N ietzsche for example -began to call attention to another aspect o f personhood. Not the species-specific faculties whereby humans rise above nature and necessity is the theme here; rather it is the stark realities o f concretely experienced life, exposing all idealistic approaches as empty and futile. This latter aspect o f personhood was taken up and developed by various modem movements and trends, in recent times most notably by the existentialist, post structuralist and neo-pragmatist philosophers (Heidegger, Sartre, Lyotard, Rorty and others).
The language that personhood speaks in these latter philosophers still abounds with concepts like morality, freedom, creativity -just as was the case with the classical discourses o f this macromotive. But now, in existentialism for example, these and other concepts refer to the inner acts o f the lonely individual struggling valiantly, if vainly, against alienation, despair and death. The ethics o f this struggle relates in the first place not to the technologies o f transformational lifestyles, but to the authenticity o f lived experience. It is interesting to note that even though the experiential element is quite prominent in this particular manifestation o f personhood, it is nevertheless a certain theoretical insight into the nature o f human experience that is ultimately essential here -in contrast to the repertoire o f practical techniques and styles and exercises that is so characteristic o f the transformational ideal .18 * * * Finally, as the last o f the macromotives being reviewed here, personhood also needs to be considered from the vantage point o f its own emotive logic: that unique operational feature which, more than any other factor, enables a m acromotive to establish its apparent power and superiority.
Recall again our findings on the emotive logics o f the other motives we have looked at. In the case o f nature, it was especially the pow er o f being able to enclose', in the case o f knowledge, the pow er o f being able to constitute or represent, in the case o f pow er itself, the ability to effect change. W hat would be the distinctive feature that is capable o f elevating personhood above the accom plishments o f all these other motives?
In our introductory remarks on the general make-up o f this motive, w e seem to have already touched on this one essential feature. It is nothing else than the 18 Which is o f coursc not to say that the "experience" associated with this ideal is o f a kind which cannot also be explored or expressed theoretically. The point is only that trans formationalism in modem Western societies is not so much a defined philosophical view of life (like existentialism), as a search for a noble way o f life. Again, this docs not mean that there can be no conceivable connection between existentialist ethics and modem trans formationalism Historical evidence, which I will not review here, is to the contrary.
power associated with full subjectivity: the power to experience things, and the pow er to give direct and unmediated expression to this experience.
T he num ber o f m acrom otives and how they touch our personal life
Having looked at a few macromotives, their inner emotive logic and some highlights in their historical development, let us return again, by w ay o f a summary perspective, to the general form and function o f macromotives, and then reflect on the manner in which the latter surreptitiously penetrate our existential experience o f the world.
At the beginning o f this article, these motives were introduced as a set o f encompassing themes that have decisively shaped cultural concerns throughout the ages. They are themes that motivate, on the level o f ultimate convictions, individual thought and practice, as well as collective social behaviour. Spanning great historical divides (such as the passing o f antiquity into the medieval period), they do, however, take on forms and functions that are characteristic o f the cultural epoch in which they operate. The motive o f knowledge, for example, operates in modem culture largely by way o f the expression it receives in science and technology. M acromotives are further characterised by the feelings o f awe and reverence which they evoke in people: each motive being able to present itself as the ultimate phenomenon, the deepest mystery or the highest value, that humans can ever be confronted with.
A question that arises in this context is: Just how many o f these macromotives are there? Although the four that have been introduced above, have always struck me as being prime examples o f what one wishes to capture with this concept, it seems a bit improbable to believe that there are actually only four o f these motives. There may indeed be others. Probably much has already been written about them, in other contexts and using different viewpoints than the present one. In terms o f the framework articulated here, the important thing to keep in mind when reviewing other potential motives, is that w hatever "candidate" presents itself to our analysis, it should be expressive o f the same kind o f ultra-reality which these other motives can lay claim to, to be acceptable to this rather exclusive club.
• The concrete relevance of m acromotives
Let me conclude this section by reflecting for a moment on the concrete relevance that macromotives have for our daily lives.
Consider, by way o f example, four phenomena that touch all o f us intimately and overpoweringly: information, authority, love and death.
Information is w hat w e seemingly need to survive in the "Third W ave" world we (are coming to) live in (cf. Toffler, 1980; 1990) . This is claimed to be a pervasive need that none o f us can really escape. But surely it is also a haven that many o f us turn to, to find diversion, insight, meaning. Being aw are o f our past, realising what is presently happening to our community, our society, our w orld, our cosmos, is w hat counts. It is as if in some way we are miraculously deliveredeven if only for a moment -from the circumstantial prisons in which w e find ourselves, if w e can only acquire some factual knowledge o f w hat is really at stake, what is truly worthy o f our attention and understanding.
A uthority is something known to everyone o f us. We wield it, or w e m eet with it: according to different situations w e find ourselves in. Either way, it very much determines the shape o f things in and around our lives. And coupled to values like position and prestige, the figure o f authority com es to loom large in the dream s o f many who are not satisfied with mere survival or even with the pleasures o f the good life.
Love, mostly in its romantic form, is regularly praised as the m ost wonderful experience anyone can have. The gaze o f the beloved appears to be able to bring meaning into the most despairing life. And one can immediately feel the argumentative force o f M eursault's judgement (in the novel The Stranger by Albert Camus) that none o f the certainties dear to a priest are "worth one strand o f a w om an's hair" .
D eath intrudes into our lives as the ultimate and untimely horizon. The last word always belongs to the grim reaper -the implacable representative o f the great O rder o f Things; the order which not only swallows up plans, people, and pow er structures, but also civilizations and cultures and, perhaps, one day, history itself.
No need to dem onstrate in detail that, what has been at issue in the above remarks, is the surrender o f human beings, in their innermost lives, to norms and values and facts that finally fall under the shadow o f m acroinotivational realities. Knowledge (in information), pow er (in authority), personhood (in love), nature (in death) -they not only speak decisively in cultural history, their presence is felt, sometimes chillingly, in our most intimate environments and experiences.
D o o y ew eerd 's theory o f ground m otives
The term "m otive", that is used in this article to designate a particular type o f idealisation constituting the object o f our investigation, is borrow ed from the Dutch philosopher Herman D ooyew eerd ; author o f a body o f work dedicated to a Reformational-Christian philosophy).19 In fact, his theory of "ground m otives", as he called them, is not without influence on the way that these idealisations are interpreted in the present analysis. Also, I share D ooyew eerd's conviction that the ultimate motives that predominate in culture and society are in fact idolisatiom , and should therefore be the object o f a critical theory. (Though, in contrast to D ooyw eerd's rather optimistic view on this point, I do not believe that any critical reflection can escape being somehow, at some point, somewhere along the line, seduced by these awesome phenomena that enter into common human experience.) I further agree that a critique of idolisation can best take its starting point in (what 1 would term) the JudeoChristian " feel" for a fundamental divide that exists between a life-giving Word and the world that it addresses.
But there are important differences between the present analysis and the approach taken by Dooyeweerd. For example, his theory distinguishes three "dialectical" (that is, in practical terms: open to critique) ground motives that successively constitute the deepest spiritual impulses o f three great epochs in the history o f W estern civilisation, namely the Greek motive o f form and m atter, the scholastic motive -active in the Middle ages -o f nature and grace, and the modem humanistic motive o f nature and freedom . The two poles o f the humanistic motive are sometimes also referred to as, respectively, the ideal o f science and the ideal o f personality. (A fourth and non-dialectical motive, that o f the Christian religion's commitment to a divine revelation concerning creation, fall and redemption, was early on compromised in Byzantine culture and then in the scholastic synthesis, coming briefly to the fore again with the Reformation. But this motive is considered by Dooyeweerd never to have had -in its pure formthe same pervasive cultural impact that these other motives had.)
The macromotives discussed in this article differ from the spiritual forces posited by Dooyew eerd, in that they have been shown to cut across all epochal or historical or cultural divides. This means that personhood, for example, as it has been interpreted in this article, cannot be the same as D ooyew eerd's ideal o f personality (the latter constituting one pole o f the humanistic groundmotive). The former is based on an emotive logic that evidently transcends the cultural " m indset" o f the humanistic paradigm that Dooyeweerd is concerned with.
On the other hand, I do believe that D ooyeweerd is correct in attaching great importance to the matter o f cultural contextualisation. Indeed, it is inevitable that a macromotive such as personhood will today be experienced in an epochal 19 Dooycwccrd's magnum opus is his 4-volume work entitled A New Critique o f Theoretical Thought, which first appeared in the Dutch version in 1935 -1936 . See Dooyeweerd (1969 .
Koers 61 (2) 1996:129-151 context that is decisively different from, say, the late M iddle ages or G reek civilization. And one may assume that this will be the case with all macromotivational themes. Knowledge, for example, in its impact on the modem world, can scarcely bypass the cultural steering pow ers o f science and technology.2° These pow ers act as a medium, as it were, through which knowledge, in one o f its modern-day transformations, is transm itted across the whole o f the cultural landscape. In antiquity, for example, the nearest equivalent to such a mediating complex, acting in the interests o f knowledge, would probably be the ideal o f philosophical truth. Connected to this ideal w ere certain guiding concepts expressive o f the concerns o f knowledge, such as logos and theoria} 1
• The role o f nature in Dooyew eerd's model
In spite o f D ooyew eerd's insistence 011 setting cultural-historical limits to the operation o f ground motives, however, there are in D ooyew eerd's conception certain clues that do, in fact, point to the existence o f (what we have com e to discern as) macromotives. Consider, for example, the role that nature plays in his model. It seems to surface, in one way or another, in each o f the three culturally formative motives. In the G reek motive, the reference to "m atter" has basically to do with the pervasive influence that the ancient cults o f nature worship had on the intellectual and the practical life o f the community. In the scholastic motive (which accom modates G reek views to the authentic Christian motive), w e find "nature" designating the inherent natural order o f things: an order which w as, so the Church taught, supplemented by the realm o f grace, faith and salvationbringing the natural world to its higher, spiritual destination.
And in the humanistic motive we find "nature" posited as that which must be scientifically overcome for humanity to realise its true freedom. Clearly, then, D ooyew eerd's model com es close to recognising -if only implicitly -the universal significance o f nature (in different connotations o f the term) as a macromotivational force.
• The way in which p o w er is conceptualised
We find a com parable state o f affairs, when taking account o f the way that po w er is conceptualised in this model. At first glance, the only real reference to pow er seems to be in the context o f the humanistic ideal o f science. It appears that for D ooyeweerd the latter ideal is synonymous with a certain " impulse" to dominate 20 By this I do not mean to say that scicncc and technology, arc the only steering powers. Economical, political and organizational imperatives must also be considered in this context.
2 1 A useful overview o f some knowledge types that can be distinguished in Greek philosophy is found in Habermas (1973) nature. He even speaks o f a "domination-motive" in this regard (Dooyeweerd, 1968:49) . But when it becomes apparent that the so-called "form-motive" o f Greek culture is analysed by Dooyeweerd as a deeply spiritual preoccupation with the aspect o f mastery and control, and that the foundational dynamics o f Roman culture is similarly associated with a deification o f power; then again we seem to be confronted by a pervasive presence o f pow er at the birth o f great cultural formations (Dooyew eerd, 1968:40, 91; 1963:22-27 ).
• D ooyew eerd's fixed num ber o f ground m otives and the bipolar structure ascribed to them Two obvious differences between D ooyew eerd's model and the present analysis, that 1 will simply note in passing, are the fixed number o f his ground motives, and the identical bipolar structure that he ascribes to each o f them. The latter structure is supposed to explain the internal "dialectic" one encounters in these motives, a dialectic that is absent -so D ooyeweerd claims -from the Christian motive. Regarding the bipolar structure o f the so-called humanistic motive, it is true that D ooyew eerd distinguishes a variety o f paradigms within which this motive com es to actual historical expression At the root o f these paradigmatic variations he discerns, however, two fundamental and opposing interpretations o f the humanistic motive. They are represented by the philosophical traditions of, on the one hand, rationalism and on the other hand, irrationalism. A s far as the personality ideal in the Dooyeweerdian model is concerned, these tw o conflicting interpretations roughly correspond to my notion o f the divergence in the (m odem ) interpretation o f personhood: either in terms o f universal human nature or in terms o f individual subjectivity. The transform ationalist interpretation o f person hood (the idealisation o f personal change), how ever, is something that does not figure as a separate systematic category in D ooyew eerd's conception o f the humanistic motive.
To conclude this brief overview o f D ooyew eerd's theory o f ground motives, I should mention the fact that he w as unwilling to have these motives considered as mere them es o f philosophical reflection or as cultural-historical frameworks. The spiritual reality that he attributed to these motives entailed, to his w ay o f thinking, the necessary consequence that they must rather be thought o f as inspiring philosophical thematisation and historical periodisation. M y own view regarding the kind o f reality that is to be ascribed to macromotives, is, firstly, that they definitely effect the kind o f overpowering aw e that D ooyew eerd associates with ground motives. But, secondly, 1 see no compelling reason to think o f macro motives as more than a select set o f phenomena that evoke a certain kind o f response from human beings.
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T he postm odern critique o f m etanarratives
Finally, there is still another matter that needs to be addressed by a contemporary theory o f macromotives. This is the whole issue o f the postm odern critique o f socalled metanarratives. Is a theory o f m acromotives not ju st one more attem pt to construct a grand discourse on discourses, a towering edifice for the contemplative gaze, from where w e may get a fix on first foundations and last horizons?
My answer to this kind o f query is as follows. Firstly, it should be noted that the macromotives discussed here are viewed critically, precisely in term s o f the m eta status they carry in ancient and m odem discourses. Secondly, I have attem pted to show how these motives can be analysed as being in the process o f undermining (in a sense "deconstructing") one another, even when they seem to form combinations, wholes and unities.
On the other hand it is true that my own analysis represents an effort to subsume many different languages o f thought, in terms o f certain properties they have, under a comprehensive viewpoint. And this hangs together with my own belief that there is a cognitive capacity within the human mind/brain that is specialised tow ard the categorial conceptualisation -at a certain level o f reflection -o f some kind o f principle or function or process, as being in some w ay in control o f (aspects of) our experiential w orld.22
Such a concept o f governance is the hallmark o f any discourse that intends to say something philosophically significant. The concept in question can derive its content from a host o f available possibilites: anything from a metaphysical worldorder, to networks o f pow er in society, to the idea o f textuality or o f contingency. In this sense, then, I would say that the dream o f a deeply-im pacting critical discourse in which nothing is allowed to acquire any normative m eta-status, is just that: a futile dream. 
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Compare Chomsky's (1988:156-158) view that the mind's capacity for theory construction is part o f the human biological endowment This is an idea that deserves to be studied seriously, in spite o f the fact that the Chomskyan turn is macromotivated by the nature/knowledge complex
